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ABSTRACT 
 
International institutions are increasingly being challenged by domestic opposition and 
nationalist political forces. Yet, levels of politicization differ significantly across countries 
facing the same international authority as well as within countries over time. This raises the 
question of when and why the mass public poses a challenge to international cooperation. In 
this article, we develop a theoretical framework for understanding the nature and implications 
of politicization of international cooperation, outlining three scope conditions: the nature of 
public contestation, the activities of political entrepreneurs, and the permissiveness of political 
opportunity structures. By empirically examining these scope conditions, we demonstrate that 
politicization can have both stabilizing and destabilizing effects on international cooperation. 
Highlighting the systemic implications of politicization for international cooperation has 
important implications for international relations scholarship. While international organizations 
may face challenges, they also have remarkable ways of being resilient. 
 
Key words: international institutions; public opinion; politicization; European integration; 
political entrepreneurs; referendums 
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Introduction  
One of the most challenging developments in recent years for the liberal international 
order has been the growing popular backlash against international cooperation. In countries as 
diverse as Brazil, Britain, the Philippines and the United States, citizens have voted politicians 
into office that campaigned on promises to withdraw from international institutions such the 
Paris climate agreement, the international criminal court (ICC), and the European Union (EU). 
Public opinion has become increasingly critical of individual international and supranational 
institutions,1such as trade institutions,2 international courts,3 and European institutions.4 This 
popular opposition has been consequential in delaying and preventing the creation of new 
international institutions5 and has even led to withdrawals from existing institutions.6 With 
mantras such as “America First” and “Take Back Control”, isolationism, nationalism and 
protectionism are back on the political scene with a vengeance. While a decade ago, a 
withdrawal of a member state from the EU or the unraveling of the WTO’s dispute settlement 
system seemed virtually impossible, this has now become reality. At the same time, there have 
also been vocal popular demands for more or continued institutionalized international 
cooperation, such as the “Remain” campaign in the UK and the worldwide climate youth 
movement, and confidence in international organizations, such as the UN, remains high.7 This 
article explores when and how this domestic public contestation influences international 
cooperation. 
Skepticism about the merits of international cooperation is nothing new and countries’ 
national interest has always been at the heart of international politics. What is new, however, is 
the increasing politicization of international cooperation. The mass public has become 
                                                 
1 Bearce and Jolliff Scott 2019. 
2 Guisinger and Saunders 2017; Naoi and Urata 2013. 
3 Chaudoin 2016; Voeten 2019b. 
4 Hutter et al. 2016; De Vries 2018. 
5 Mendez et al. 2014. 
6 Hobolt 2016. 
7 Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015. 
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increasingly aware, mobilized, and polarized on issues surrounding globalization, international 
institutions, and the modes of foreign policymaking more generally.8 These developments also 
pose a challenge for international relations research. While traditional international relations 
research paid little attention to the role of the mass public,9 recent work in the field has taken 
the influence of domestic public opinion in foreign policymaking much more seriously. 
Nonetheless, scholarship on international cooperation often makes simplifying assumptions 
about the public’s underlying preferences. Audience cost theory, for example, assumes that 
policymakers can gauge the domestic price a leader would pay for making foreign threats and 
then backing down10 and that such domestic constraints can therefore serve as a credibility-
enhancing device in international negotiations.11 Likewise, research on two-level games in 
international negotiations argues that governments can use voters’ preferences as a device to 
enhance their bargaining power.12 These models presume that governments have a good 
understanding of how both their own and their opponent’s domestic audiences would react to 
different foreign policy decisions. At the same time, a large literature on individual preferences 
and political psychology in international relations demonstrates that gauging what the mass 
public wants is far from straightforward. Recent work shows considerable variation in public 
preferences on forms of international cooperation, such as international trade,13 foreign direct 
investment,14 foreign aid and global public goods provision,15 international organizations16 and 
European integration.17 And even when the public has clear preferences on foreign 
                                                 
8 De Vries 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hutter et al. 2016; Zürn et al. 2012; Walter 2021. 
9 e.g., Keohane 1984; Waltz 1979; Wendt 1992. Even research with a strong focus on domestic politics has 
predominantly focused on domestic elites and interest groups, rather than the mass public, (e.g. Frieden 1991; 
Milner 1997; Moravcsik 1997, 1998; Putnam 1988). 
10 Tomz 2007; Fearon 1994; Weiss 2013. 
11 Lohmann 2003. 
12 Hug and König 2002; Putnam 1988; Schelling 1978; Schneider and Cederman 1994. 
13 Kuo and Naoi 2015; Nguyen and Spilker 2019. 
14 Pandya 2010. 
15 Bechtel, Genovese, and Scheve 2019. 
16 Bearce and Jolliff Scott 2019. 
17 Hobolt and De Vries 2016. 
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policymaking, they might not necessarily reveal these preferences by acting upon them.18 So, 
while existing work has generated important insights into who wants which kinds of policies 
and who is more open or opposed to international cooperation, our understanding of whether 
and how these preferences matter for foreign policymaking is much less developed. 
This article explores the causes and consequences of the politicization of international 
cooperation. Politicization refers to the process of making an issue political, that is debating it 
in the public sphere as an issue of public contestation.19 We argue that the mass public has 
become increasingly attentive to international issues and can constrain governments and 
international institutions. Some scholarship has suggested that this growing politicization is 
largely a function of increasing authority of international institutions.20 Yet, politicization 
differs across the member states that belong to the same international institutions. This raises 
questions about the possible causes and consequences of politicization. How does the growing 
politicization of foreign policy and international institutions, a polarization in public support 
for international cooperation, and the rise of nationalist parties change the role of the mass 
public in international relations? Why does the politicization of international cooperation differ 
not only across countries that are members of the same organization, but also within countries 
over time? And does the changing role of the mass public in international politics ultimately 
strengthen or weaken the stability of international institutions?  
To answer these questions, we seek to bridge the gap between the international relations 
literature and the comparative politics literature on political behavior. By fusing insights from 
the study of opinion formation and party competition that explores how international issues 
become politicized domestically and the study of international organizations, we develop a 
framework for understanding the politicization of international cooperation and the systemic 
implications for the depth and scope of international cooperation. We argue that in order to 
                                                 
18 Guisinger 2017; e.g., Achen and Bartels 2017, vol. 4; Page and Bouton 2008. 
19 Zürn et al. 2012. 
20 Börzel and Zürn 2021; Zürn et al. 2012. 
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become politically consequential, two conditions must be met. First, international issues need 
to become publicly contested and politicized. There are two key elements that lead to a 
politicization of international cooperation: public discontent about existing forms of 
international cooperation – which requires both awareness and polarization of opinion – and 
the mobilization of this discontent by political entrepreneurs. Political entrepreneurs mobilize 
public opinion to their strategic advantage.  In doing so, they tap into pre-existing sources of 
discontent that are most advantageous to politicize. Determining what is causally prior – public 
discontent or political mobilization – is difficult as they reinforce each other. What is important 
is that both conditions are met.  
Second, for public contestation to present a serious challenge to international 
cooperation, political opportunity structures, such as permissive elections or referendums on 
international treaties, must exist to channel this discontent into concrete demands for more or 
less international cooperation. When transferred onto the international level through these 
channels, growing politicization means that the mass public can become more important for 
international relations and international institutions in ways that can either enhance or constrain 
international cooperation. On the one hand, more public debate about the contours of 
international cooperation has the potential to bolster the legitimacy of international institutions. 
On the other hand, mobilization of nationalist sentiments by political entrepreneurs makes it 
more difficult for governments to enter new multilateral agreements, reduces their credibility 
when they do, and increases the likelihood that they will renege on these commitments ex post.  
Empirically, we draw on evidence from around the world, with a particular focus on 
Europe. While the bulk of existing work on the role of public opinion on foreign policymaking 
stems from the US context,21 focusing on other countries allows us to broaden our focus and 
demonstrate the wide scope of our argument. Moreover, the European context allows us to 
                                                 
21 Baum and Potter 2008. 
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examine variation in politicization across countries exposed to the most ambitious attempt of 
international cooperation to date. The EU is perhaps one of the clearest manifestations of the 
Liberal International Order,22 as the most advanced international organization in terms of the 
depth and scope of rule-based integration among its member states. It has facilitated free trade 
across its members and has a treaty basis that expresses the commitment to democracy and 
human rights. Looking beyond the US context teaches us that the effects of politicization are 
not unidirectional, but instead can have both stabilizing and destabilizing consequences for 
international cooperation. This is an important perspective for students of international relations 
more generally. While international organizations face threats to their existence, they also have 
ways to move through crises and be resilient. 
 
Public contestation of international cooperation  
International cooperation is often opaque and difficult for ordinary citizens to grasp. It 
involves organizations or agreements with which most people lack direct experience. In much 
of the early work on international cooperation, the assumption was that the low salience and 
welfare-enhancing effects of international cooperation would lead to a “permissive 
consensus”23 among citizens.24 As a result, it has traditionally been assumed that policymakers 
would not be punished for engaging in international cooperation. Yet, as the level of 
international authority and the public awareness of it has grown, such a permissive consensus 
can no longer be taken for granted.25 While some public skepticism about the merits of 
international cooperation has been growing for quite some time,26 the intensity with which it 
has manifested itself more recently is a rather new development. Against this backdrop, it is 
                                                 
22 Lake et al. 2021 
23 The term “permissive consensus” was coined by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) to describe the largely 
passive role of citizens that has long characterized the European integration process. 
24 Haas 1958; Keohane 1984; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970. 
25 Zürn et al. 2012. 
26 Trubowitz and Burgoon 2020. 
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important to understand variation in public contestation of international cooperation across 
countries, across types of cooperation, and across time.  To do so, we examine the nature and 
sources of public discontent with international cooperation as well as the activities of political 
entrepreneurs and political opportunity structures in order to explain how the interaction of 
these factors shape their impact on international cooperation. 
 
Nature and sources of public discontent with international cooperation  
We start with examining the mass public’s attitudes toward international cooperation, 
broadly defined as attitudes about the opening of borders to flows of goods, services, capital, 
persons, specific international institutions and general international cooperation. If the public 
is broadly supportive of international cooperation, then it places few constraints on policy-
makers operating on the international level. The opaque nature of international organizations 
or agreements shielded political elites against the opinions of the public for a long time. Trade 
liberalization and international cooperation were perceived to generate a sustained and diffused 
improvement in living standards for a large fraction of the population.27 Over the past two 
decades, during which economic shocks raised the salience of increasing inequality and 
migration, international cooperation has become more contentious in public debate.28 Studies 
suggest that the public is often more critical of international institutions than elites are and that 
among certain parts of the population discontent is on the rise.29  
What are the roots of public discontent with international cooperation? Existing research 
has three broad sets of explanations: an economic, a cultural and an institutional explanation. 
The first focuses on the economic consequences of international cooperation and the long-term 
structural changes in labor markets and the welfare state, rising inequality as well as short-term 
economic shock that are associated with open economies and that create winners and losers. In 
                                                 
27 Ruggie 1982; Mansfield and Rudra 2021. For a critical discussion see Goodman and Pepinsky 2021.  
28 Colantone and Stanig 2019; Bisbee et al. 2020; Walter 2021. 
29 De Vries and Hobolt 2016; Trubowitz and Burgoon 2020 
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this view, dissatisfaction with the existing system is caused by material hardship experienced 
by those ‘left behind’ by globalization and technological change.30 The second explanation 
highlights the importance of growing concerns about identity and cultural value divides.31 It is 
based on the idea that the rise in electoral support for political parties that stress parochialism, 
nationalism, protectionism and opposition to immigration constitute a “cultural backlash” 
against liberal elites.32 The dividing line is perceived to be between the highly educated who 
espouse more pro-immigration and cosmopolitan attitudes, and the less well-educated who are 
largely wary of immigration and open borders.33 The third institutional explanation focuses on 
international institutions themselves and highlights the way in which they increasingly 
constrain domestic politics and policies as well as states’ ability to protect the losers from these 
processes. As a result, international authority has become increasingly contested,34 not just in 
terms of its legitimacy,35 but also in terms of multilateral practices to challenge established 
multilateral institutions.36 
Although the literature often treats these three explanations of public opinion as 
mutually exclusive, these factors should not be viewed as operating in isolation. After all, most 
social phenomena are multi-causal in nature and need to be addressed as such. The economic, 
cultural and institutional explanations interact and together help understand complex 
phenomena like support for international cooperation. Differences between economic groups 
and economic grievances are often articulated in cultural terms and politically institutionalized. 
Processes of economic and political interdependence have coincided with increasing migration 
flows, creating difficult trade-offs,37 and cultural, economic and political motivations may co-
                                                 
30 Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Colantone and Stanig 2018; Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth 2021; Owen and 
Johnston 2016; Mansfield and Rudra 2021; Rogowski 2021. 
31 Norris and Inglehart 2019; Mutz 2018. 
32 Norris and Inglehart 2019. 
33 Cavaille and Marshall 2019; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014. 
34 Zürn et al. 2012. Börzel and Zürn 2018. 
35 Tallberg and Zürn 2019. 
36 Morse and Keohane 2014. 
37 Goodman and Pepinsky 2021. 
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exist. Indeed, the mass public itself tends view international cooperation as “a package of 
openness”,38 that includes free trade and economic cooperation, but also non-economic aspects 
such as loss of national control, growing exposure to foreign influences including immigration, 
and an increasingly multi-cultural society with shifting social norms. It is thus important to 
study how people navigate these multiple dimensions, how they make the relevant trade-offs, 
and how this is related to support or opposition towards international cooperation more 
generally. People may like the idea of international cooperation in the abstract, but not display 
much appreciation for technocratic standard setting or the cost of annual contributions. 
Consider support for the activities of international organizations (IOs), for example. 
Using data from the 1995, 2003, and 2013 waves of the International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP) and 23 countries39 across five continents, Figure 1 shows the percentages of respondents 
who view international institutions positively (black line) or negatively (gray line). It shows a 
decline over time in the people who support the right of IOs “to enforce solutions to certain 
problems” and an increase in people who thinks “IOs take too much power for national 
governments”. Moreover, Figure 1 demonstrates that support for IO activities varies not just 
over time, but also differs significantly depending on which dimensions of these activities we 
examine. For example, over two-thirds majority (68 per cent) of respondents in countries across 
the world agree that “for certain problems, like environment pollution, international bodies 
should have the right to enforce solutions” (2013). At the same time, however, only 37 per cent 
of respondents think that their country in general should follow the decisions of international 
organizations, even if their government does not agree with the decision, and almost every 
second respondent (48 per cent) agrees that international organizations are taking away too 
much power from their national governments. In fact, among those agreeing that IOs should be 
                                                 
38 Margalit 2019. 
39 These countries are Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Georgia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Japan, Lithuania, Latvia, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, South 
Korea, and Taiwan. Only countries which participated in all three survey waves are included. See Supplementary 
Material. 
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able to enforce solutions, about one quarter thinks that their government should not comply 
with these solutions if it disagrees.  
 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that public opinion about international cooperation is ambivalent in 
nature.40 Attitude ambivalence is important, because it makes citizens much more open to cue 
taking from political elites.41 This makes public opinion more malleable. In an absence of an 
international public sphere, citizens often rely on political elites or the mass media when to 
comes forming opinions about international cooperation.42  
Taken together with the complex and multidimensional nature of international 
cooperation, we argue that this makes the actions of political entrepreneurs, and the media 
response they might invoke, crucially important in trying to understand how trade-offs related 
to international cooperation are framed and how the mass public thinks about them as a result. 
By framing international cooperation as a package deal, political entrepreneurs can activate 
those pre-existing public sentiments that are most advantageous for them to politicize. This 
helps explain why citizens in countries facing similar levels of international authority often 
show different levels of discontent with and support for international institutions, and why 
countries also differ in the extent to which opposition to international institutions becomes 
politically relevant. 
 
The role of political entrepreneurs  
                                                 
40 De Vries 2018. 
41 Zaller 1992. 
42 See for example Ahlquist et al. 2020; Baum and Potter 2008; Berinsky 2009; Medrano 2010; De Vries and 
Edwards 2009. 
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Public discontent with international cooperation alone is therefore not sufficient to lead 
to a serious challenge to international institutions. For such discontent to matter politically, it 
must be politicized. Politicization refers to the process of making an issue political, that is 
debating it in the public sphere as an issue of public contestation.43 Governments may wish to 
blame international institutions for bad domestic policy outcomes. President Trump’s stated 
intention to withdraw from the World Health Organization in an effort to distract from the US 
government’s suboptimal response to the COVID-19 crisis might be viewed in this light. While 
withdrawal from IOs is among the more radical responses, governments routinely blame IOs 
for negative domestic outcomes. Examples include the “scapegoating” of the IMF for the 
conditionality incorporated in their programs44 or the EU in the context of the Eurozone crisis.45  
Another way in which discontent is mobilized is by political entrepreneurs.46 Many 
mainstream politicians have supported, at least publicly, international organizations and liberal 
international order built on multilateralism. This consensus is being increasingly challenged by 
political entrepreneurs, who mobilize voters with a nationalist “drawbridge up” message, 
favoring stronger borders, less migration, protectionist policies and withdrawal from 
international cooperation.47 This mobilization is not only the result of grievances associated 
with international cooperation, as discussed in the previous section, but also due to the effort of 
strategic politicians.48  Public dissatisfaction and efforts of strategic politicians reinforce each 
other. Political entrepreneurs try to successfully ignite opinions that lay dormant or mobilize 
aspects of pre-existing discontent that are most advantageous to politicize. In doing so, political 
entrepreneurs seek to gain electoral advantage from driving a wedge between mainstream elites 
and their supporters by mobilizing opposition to international cooperation.49 Such mobilization 
                                                 
43 Zürn et al. 2012. 
44  Vreeland 2003; Bird and Willett 2004. 
45 Fernández‐Albertos et al. 2013; Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Fetzer 2019. 
46 De Vries and Hobolt 2020. 
47 Börzel and Risse 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kriesi et al. 2008; Zürn and De Wilde 2016. 
48 Walter 2021. 
49 De Vries and Hobolt 2020. 
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can be significantly amplified by the media.50 In response, more cosmopolitan political forces 
have equally increasingly mobilized on the issue of international cooperation, turning against 
this nationalist message.51 Green and social liberal parties have increasingly committed 
themselves to cosmopolitan and internationalist stances,52 and so have government leaders, like 
the Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau, French president Emmanuel Macron or New 
Zealand’s prime minister Jacinda Ardern to name a few recent examples. 
Theories of issue evolution and issue manipulation53 teach us that strategic politicians 
are crucial in the politicization of previously non-salient issues, as parties facing a string of 
losses will attempt to redirect political competition to structure political competition in such a 
way that they gain leverage. Attacking international cooperation is one way for politicians to 
seek to gain such leverage, especially where public discontent already exists. In multi-party 
systems where the mainstream political coalitions are built around commitments to 
international institutions such as the WTO, NATO or the EU, it is costly for mainstream parties 
to challenge this established order, however, as taking a stance on a controversial wedge issue 
is inherently risky because the mobilization of such issues may destabilize parties internally, 
put off certain voters, and jeopardize future coalition negations.54 However, issue 
entrepreneurship also carries the potential of reshaping political competition and thus reaping 
electoral success. A core feature of the politicization of opposition to international cooperation 
thus comes from challenger parties that occupy losing positions on the dominant dimension of 
political competition to act as issue entrepreneurs and thus to play a key role in the politicization 
of issues.55 
                                                 
50 Foos and Bischof 2019. 
51 Kriesi et al. 2008. 
52 Bakker et al. 2015. 
53 Carmines and Stimson 1989; Riker et al. 1996. 
54 Van de Wardt, De Vries, and Hobolt 2014. 
55 De Vries and Hobolt 2020 
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One prominent example of how political entrepreneurs have mobilized international 
cooperation is the growing emphasis on opposition to the EU among challenger parties across 
European countries. The EU issue constitutes a classic wedge issue in European politics, as it 
is an issue that is not easily integrated into the dominant dimension of left-right politics. The 
process of European integration has provoked deep tensions within major parties on both the 
left and right.56 As EU membership is a core component of the postwar mainstream political 
consensus in Europe and its commitment to the liberal international order, an openly anti-EU 
position will also make parties less credible as coalition partners. As a result, most mainstream 
parties have preferred not to politicize an issue which could lead to internal splits and voter 
defection. In contrast, for challenger parties, there are great incentives to mobilize opposition 
to the EU to attract new voters, often in tandem with anti-immigration and nationalist 
messages.57 
We can use data from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) on the positions of 
political parties across Europe58 to illustrate this point. Experts were asked to rank each party’s 
“general position on European integration” from (1) strongly opposed to (7) strongly in favor. 
Figure 2 shows that mainstream parties are united in their commitment to the pro-EU cause, 
with an average around 6, while challenger parties are much more heterogeneous and generally 
more Euroskeptic. Looking at this by party family, we can see that the radical right and the 
radical left mobilize the anti-EU cause, while all the other party families are broadly pro-
European, regardless of whether they are left or right. Due to the fact that mainstream political 
elites remain on average considerably more supportive of the European integration than 
citizens, Euroskeptic political entrepreneurs can reap electoral gains. 
 
*** Figure 2 about here *** 
                                                 
56 Marks and Wilson 2000. 
57 Hobolt and De Vries 2015, 
58 Bakker et al. 2015. 
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Yet, there is also considerable ideological heterogeneity in the content of Euroskeptic 
party cues. Research has shown that while leftwing Euroskeptic parties mobilize economic 
anxieties and anti-austerity concerns against the European project, rightwing Euroskeptic 
parties rally opposition by highlighting national identity considerations and feelings of cultural 
threats.59 This points to the ability of political entrepreneurs to frame international cooperation 
in such a way that suits them best. The fact that the mass public tends to view international 
cooperation as a “package of openness” that includes not only economic aspects relating to free 
trade, but also non-economic ones such as sovereignty concerns, concern about foreign 
influences or a multi-cultural society,60 provides political entrepreneurs with some flexibility 
in choosing how to frame the threats of international cooperation and focus those elements that 
are more salient for voters. 
 Overall, the actions of political entrepreneurs are crucial in determining the nature and 
level of public contestation of international cooperation. Strategic politicians can harness 
drivers of discontent for their own political gain. Public discontent is thus a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for politicization. Public contestation is likely to be high when the drivers 
of discontent with existing forms and levels of international cooperation are activated by 
political entrepreneurs. In contrast, it will be lower if either the public is satisfied with the status 
quo of international cooperation or there is an absence of political entrepreneurs to mobilize 
any discontent. Determining what is causally prior – public discontent or political mobilization 
– is inevitably tricky as they feed off and reinforce each other. What is important is that public 
contestation requires both.  
 
Political opportunity structures  
                                                 
59 De Vries and Edwards 2009 
60 Margalit 2012 
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Taken together, public discontent with and mobilization of international cooperation by 
political entrepreneurs generates public contestation. But public contestation only leads to a 
serious challenge to international cooperation when the right political opportunity structures are 
present. Such opportunity structures include institutional arrangements that allow public 
discontent to translate into an effective challenge to international cooperation.  
One obvious pathway to a direct challenge of international institutions, as we have seen 
for example in the US and Hungary, is the election of a government that is skeptical about 
international cooperation and who have both the will and the institutional power to challenge 
it. Such cases, which are the direct result of increased public discontent and elite mobilization, 
however, remain relatively rare as most Western governments are generally favorably disposed 
towards international cooperation.61 Elections are usually fought on a myriad of domestic policy 
issues. That said, certain institutional characteristics, such as electoral rules and multi-party 
systems, make it easier for political entrepreneurs to generate public contestation over 
international cooperation. Proportional electoral rules foster multi-party competition which not 
only makes it easier for new parties to breakthrough, but also easier for them to campaign on a 
more specialized issue offering.62 Within systems with majoritarian electoral rules political 
entrepreneurs face higher barriers to entry. Such contexts make it harder for new parties and 
issues to permeate the system, although this is possible, as the example of the 2017 French 
presidential elections demonstrates, in which neither of the two second-round candidates 
(Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron) belonged to any of the established French mainstream 
parties. An alternative strategy for political entrepreneurs in majoritarian contexts is to try to 
gain a stronghold within established political parties, like US president Donald Trump did 
within the Republican Party or British prime minister Boris Johnson did within the 
Conservative Party. Although it may prove harder for political entrepreneurs to mobilize issues 
                                                 
61 Trubowitz and Burgoon 2020. 
62 Ezrow et al. 2011. 
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relating to international cooperation within a majoritarian context, the systemic effect on 
international cooperation is likely to be much more profound. In contrast, in contexts with 
proportional electoral rules and multi-party competition, public discontent with international 
cooperation mobilized by political entrepreneurs may get defused through coalition 
negotiations and coalition governments, as the examples of the Freedom Party in Austria or the 
Five Star Movement in Italy demonstrate.  
The introduction of direct elections to the EU’s second legislative chamber, the 
European Parliament, four decades ago is another example of how elections can provide a 
platform for political entrepreneurs skeptical about international cooperation. These second-
order EP elections with permissive electoral rules and little at stake for voters act as an incubator 
for electoral success also at the national level by increasing their resources and heightening 
their brand and visibility.63 In the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, for example, 
parties highly critical of the EU topped the polls in Britain, France and Italy, with serious 
domestic reverberations and possible consequences for the nature of the relationship between 
these member states and the EU.  
Another way through which challenges stemming from political opportunity structures 
allow public discontent, aided by political entrepreneurs, to challenge international institutions, 
is a referendum on international cooperation. Direct democracy allows citizens a direct say on 
international institutions. Popular referendums on international treaties have long been seen as 
a means to increase the democratic legitimacy of international cooperation.64 Over the past 
decades, referendums have not only become a much more common feature in the ratification 
process of international agreements, but have also more often led to outcomes that are not in 
line with the government’s preferred outcome.65 This poses an important challenge to the 
                                                 
63 Dinas and Riera 2018; Schulte-Cloos 2018; De Vries and Hobolt 2020 
64 Hobolt 2009. 
65 Hobolt 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Mendez and Germann 2018. 
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conventional wisdom that government can use such domestic constraints to increase their 
bargaining power at the international level.66  
 
*** Figure 3 about here *** 
 
Figure 3 shows that between 1972 and 2019, 84 referendums about international 
cooperation were held across the world in countries as diverse as Brazil, Taiwan, and the UK.67 
While the majority of these referendums were about issues relating to European integration 
broadly defined, about one third of these referendums concerned international cooperation in 
the context of other international institutions, such as NATO, trade agreements, the UN, or 
international courts. Figure 3 shows that in line with our argument about the growing 
politicization of international cooperation, the use of referendums has increased in recent 
decades, and non-cooperative referendum votes, that is referendum outcomes in which voters 
vote against the establishment of a new or the continued membership in an existing international 
institution, have increased.68 Since 2010, voters have voted down proposals for more or 
continued international cooperation in every other referendum. By providing opportunities for 
political entrepreneurs, many of these referendums have also had longer term consequences by 
fostering a sustained politicization of issues related to international cooperation.  
Taken together, the mass public can turn into a relevant force for international relations 
when political entrepreneurs use political opportunity structures to their advantage to mobilize 
public discontent. 
 
Implications for countries’ ability to engage in international cooperation  
                                                 
66 Hug and König 2002; Lohmann 2003; Schneider and Cederman 1994. 
67 Full list of referendums can be found in the Supplementary Material.  
68 Walter et al. 2018. 
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Discontent with international authority, mobilized by political entrepreneurs and 
transmitted onto the international arena through political opportunity structures, changes the 
role the mass public plays in international politics. But how exactly this affects the prospects 
for international cooperation is not straightforward.69 On the one hand, these developments 
make it more difficult for policymakers to create new or sustain existing cooperative 
institutions. On the other hand, the growing involvement of the mass public provides 
possibilities for international institutions to increase their legitimacy.70 Politicization thus poses 
both a challenge to international cooperation and an opportunity for international institutions to 
show resilience.71 
How and whether the mass public matters for international cooperation, and whether 
this influence strengthens or weakens international institutions, depends on both the nature of 
public contestation and the availability of political opportunity structures. Table 1 shows four 
different scenarios for how the mass public matters for a country’s ability to engage in and 
sustain international cooperation. On the vertical axis, it distinguishes between instances of high 
contestation – in which public opinion about international cooperation is mobilized by political 
entrepreneurs – and low contestation – in which the public either is not discontent or there are 
no public entrepreneurs to mobilize existing discontent, or both. On the horizontal axis, it 
distinguishes between political opportunity structures that allow domestic contestation to be 
directly transmitted onto the international level, and those structures in which such transmission 
is much more restricted. This yields four ideal-typical scenarios for how the mass public matters 
for international institutions. 
 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
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 The first scenario of permissive consensus is one in which there is both a lack of public 
contestation and an absence of institutional opportunities for challenging the international 
order. In this scenario, international institutions are typically an elite-driven project of low 
salience and with broad public acceptance. This has always been and continues to be by far the 
most common scenario when it comes to most international institutions. Whereas some 
international institutions, such as the IMF, the EU, and the International Criminal Court, have 
become contested, the vast majority of international institutions do not attract much public 
attention. Other international organizations, like the International Civil Aviation Organization, 
the World Meteorological Organization or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons for example, rarely feature prominently in the public debate, and public opinion 
matters little to how these institutions are created, function or decay.  
In the second scenario, democratically legitimized international cooperation, the 
political institutional structure provides the public with opportunities to challenge international 
institutions. The public uses these opportunities to support these international institutions, either 
because discontent is low and/or not mobilized. In this scenario, institutional opportunities such 
as referendums give international institutions a high level of democratic legitimacy, that is the 
public’s belief that the institution’s exercise of authority is appropriate.72 An example of this is 
the support for the UN in Switzerland, a country in with a strong direct democratic tradition. 
Because of Swiss neutrality, UN membership was long a hotly contested issue in Swiss politics, 
despite the fact that numerous UN organizations are based in the country. In 1986, an 
overwhelming majority of 76 per cent of Swiss voters rejected a government proposal to join 
the UN. The issue remained a contested issue, and in the late 1990s a cross-party committee 
launched a popular initiative to put the proposal for UN membership to a second popular vote. 
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In 2002, this proposal was accepted by a 54.6 per cent majority of Swiss. As a result, 
Switzerland joined the UN and the issue quickly lost salience. The ability to directly vote on 
UN membership thus in effect legitimized Switzerland’s UN membership. Today, Swiss UN 
membership is widely accepted in Switzerland. 
 The public response, however, is not always so positive. In other cases, when public 
opposition to international cooperation remains entrenched and mobilized by political 
entrepreneurs, this may lead to lasting public discontent with the status quo. Yet, when political 
opportunity structures do not allow this contestation to be channeled into an effective 
institutional challenge, it remains simply that: a simmering discontent without any immediate 
systemic repercussions. In Austria for example, Euroskepticism is both very strong and 
mobilized by political entrepreneurs, like the Freedom Party. Yet, compared to the UK, the 
domestic contestation has had little systemic effect. This is because the Euroskeptic demands 
of the Freedom Party have been curtailed by more pro-EU coalition partners and no 
referendums on European integration have been held after the accession referendum in 1995.  
 Only when political opportunity structures are permissive is public contestation likely 
to spill over onto the international level creating a systemic challenge. This is the most 
consequential scenario from the perspective of an international institution. In this scenario of 
challenged international cooperation, shown in the lower right-hand quadrant, public 
contestation is channeled into a concrete challenge to the status quo of international 
cooperation, expressed in forms such as public vetoes of new international commitments, 
demands for differentiated integration, withdrawal from existing arrangements, or demands for 
alternative forms of international cooperation. An example of how a political entrepreneur, 
buoyed by institutional opportunities, introduced a challenge to European integration is the case 
of the Dutch politician Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom. The issue of European 
integration had not been not salient in Dutch public debate until the 2000s, when Geert Wilders 
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entered the political scene as a political entrepreneur.73 The 2005 referendum about the 
European Constitutional Treaty, the first ever referendum held in the Netherlands on EU 
matters, provided an opportunity for Wilders. With 61.5 per cent of Dutch voters voting against 
the Treaty, the referendum had significant consequences for the EU: Following the Dutch (and 
French) rejection, the EU abandoned its ambitious attempt at a Constitutional Treaty in favor 
of a more modest “amending treaty”, the Lisbon Treaty.  
Likewise, elections in which issues of international cooperation feature as key campaign 
issues, can result in this scenario. Examples include presidents Donald J. Trump in the US or 
Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, who have campaigned on a nationalist populism platform that has 
presented a direct challenge to international institutions such as the Paris Climate Agreement 
or the World Health Organization. Within the first three years of his presidency alone, Trump 
had withdrawn US membership from seven major international institutions.74 At the same time, 
the example of French President Emmanuel Macron’s attempts to achieve a serious reform of 
the EU, highlights that challenges to the status quo by some politicians may also be directed 
towards achieving closer international cooperation.  
Systemic implications of public contestation  
What are the systemic consequences of the growing involvement of domestic mass 
publics for international institutions and international cooperation more generally? The four 
scenarios discussed above suggest that the impact of the national mass public on the prospects 
of international cooperation is likely to vary significantly. The scenario with the most serious 
systemic consequences is scenario 4, a direct challenge to the international cooperation. 
Especially when the challenge comes in form of opposition to international cooperation, 
countries in this scenario have the potential to complicate each of the stages of international 
cooperation: the negotiation of new cooperative agreements, the ratification process, and the 
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functioning of international institutions. When a cooperation-skeptic domestic public, 
especially one that is mobilized by political entrepreneurs, has the opportunity to veto new 
arrangements, the salience of new cooperative agreements reduces the ability and willingness 
of policymakers to make the package-deals and side-payments that have long characterized 
international negotiations. As the literature on two-level games has demonstrated,75 this makes 
it more difficult for policymakers to negotiate new international agreements and enter 
arrangements with other countries that require compromise, even though it can also raise 
countries’ bargaining power. Ratification of international agreements also becomes more 
difficult in this scenario. When the public pays more attention to the details of the negotiations 
and when some elites mobilize voters against the negotiated agreement, it becomes harder for 
governments to control the domestic ratification dynamics. This is particularly true when 
referendums are used as a part of the ratification process. In this scenario, the outcome of the 
ratification process is thus often uncertain and the likelihood of a negotiated agreements failing 
increases. These domestic ratification constraints raise the risk of involuntary defection and 
thus may hamper governments’ ability to successfully ratify negotiated agreements.76 Finally, 
this scenario also presents an increased risk that countries will renege on their international 
commitments ex post, such as treaty renegotiations, non-compliance, or even the partial or full 
exit from existing international agreements.77 This creates uncertainty about the public 
acceptance of outcomes, even after a treaty is ratified.  
How these dynamics play out depends both on how much leverage the state in question 
has at the international level and on how the international institution itself responds to the 
challenge. The more leverage a state has, the more consequential the challenge is for the 
affected international institution. For example, in situations in which unanimity is required to 
attain a new level of cooperation, each member state’s leverage is high. In these situations, one 
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state’s failure to reach an agreement can lead the entire project to unravel (as it did after the 
2005 rejections of the European Constitutional Treaty in the Netherlands and in France). In 
these cases, cooperation-skeptic member states are also often able to negotiate substantial 
concessions, such as opt-outs from certain provisions (an example is the opt-outs Denmark 
negotiated after it had failed to ratify the Maastricht Treaty78).  
In many situations, however, the leverage of such member states is much lower. When 
decisions are taken by qualified majority voting, for example, as in many policy areas in the 
EU, dissenting votes allow the cooperation-challenging member state to cast a non-cooperative 
vote, but it cannot prevent the other member states to go ahead if a majority of member states 
supports a policy proposal. Such flexibility allows governments to signal their responsiveness 
to the skeptical domestic public, yet cooperation continues.79 In other situations, the leverage 
of the cooperation-challenging member state is so low that the other member states can force it 
to backtrack. For example, after the Greek people had overwhelmingly rejected new austerity 
measures associated with a European bailout package in a referendum during the Eurozone 
crisis in 2015, the other Eurozone countries confronted the Greek government with the choice 
to either accept more austerity or to leave the common currency. Because the Greek public, 
while opposed to austerity, had a strong preference for staying in the Eurozone,80 the Greek 
government chose to disregard the referendum vote and to accept a third bailout package 
instead. One of the reasons why challenges to the status quo are less likely to have systemic 
reverberations if they are directed towards closer or different forms of cooperation is the fact 
that the leverage of one state to compel institutional changes is much lower in most international 
settings than a state’s leverage of vetoing such changes.  
The international response to the demands of a cooperation-challenging member state 
is not just a question of leverage, however. Rather, the international institution itself, or perhaps 
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more precisely, the other member states within the international institution, also have to weigh 
the costs and benefits of accommodating these demands versus the costs and benefits of not-
accommodating them. This decision weighs particularly strongly when the challenging state is 
a member state of an international institution and opposes the deepening or the continuation of 
the institution’s existing cooperative arrangements. To the extent that the other member states 
are interested in more or continued cooperation, this creates an “accommodation dilemma”.81 
On the one hand, other member states have incentives to accommodate the demands of the 
cooperation-challenging country as far as possible in order to retain the benefits of cooperation, 
even if this means that the cooperation-challenging country receives a larger share of the overall 
cooperation gains. On the other hand, such accommodation carries the risk of encouraging other 
countries to follow suit and also trying to improve their position through a less cooperative 
stance, which may result in an eventual unraveling of the compromises that form the core of 
international agreements. As a consequence, the higher the potential contagion risks of 
accommodating the demands of a cooperation-challenging state are, the stronger the incentives 
for the other member states to take a hard, non-accommodating line in the ensuing negotiations 
in order to deter other states from following suit, and vice versa. This strategy is not without 
risks either, because it offers political entrepreneurs to use this uncompromising stance as an 
argument to delegitimize the international institution further.  
An example of how domestic contestation of an international institution, in combination 
with political opportunity structures, can have systemic implications is the case of Brexit, 
Britain’s vote to leave the EU in 2016. Public discontent with the EU has a long tradition in the 
UK. However, with no parties in Parliament advocating Britain’s exit from the EU, the issue 
was not highly contested.82 Yet, the question of membership became more mobilized when the 
elections to the EP provided a platform for the anti-EU challenger party, the UK Independence 
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Party. The party’s win in the 2014 EP elections contributed to the decision by the Conservative 
government to call a referendum on EU membership.83 The 2016 Brexit referendum then 
provided the opportunity structure for an issue that cut across the traditional party lines to turn 
into the defining issue in British politics since and to reshape public opinion in profound ways.84 
Brexit also has significant systemic implications, as it meant that one of the largest and most 
powerful member states would leave the EU. This confronted the remaining 27 EU member 
states with a significant accommodation dilemma: A loss of the close cooperative relations 
between the UK and the EU will be costly not just for the UK, but also for the EU-27. At the 
same time, making the UK better off outside the EU raises the risk that further countries leave 
the EU.85 The Brexit case thus illustrates not only the domestic scope conditions for a direct 
challenge to an international institution, but also how the international response to such a 
challenge may shape the future of the organization and may feed back into domestic mass 
politics. 
 
Conclusion  
International institutions are increasingly being challenged by domestic opposition and 
nationalist political forces. In times of a growing politicization of international politics, the 
mass public has taken on a more active role in international politics and does not always behave 
in ways predicted by governments. This study demonstrates that such developments can have 
both stabilizing and destabilizing effects on international cooperation. This suggests that the 
domestic political arena is a key battleground for protecting forms of international cooperation. 
The recent success of political entrepreneurs taking a firm aim at international organizations, 
like US president Donald J. Trump or the Philippine’s president Rodrigo Duterte, can be 
matched by those defending the international order, like French president Emmanuel Macron 
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or New Zealand prime minister Jacinda Arden. The battle is about winning the hearts and minds 
of the public. 
Our study of the role of the mass public for international cooperation has set out a 
research agenda focused on the causes and consequences of the growing public contestation 
about international cooperation. For this purpose, we have developed a framework that 
emphasizes the agency of political actors at the domestic and international level and political 
opportunity structures as crucial drivers of effective public contestation of international 
cooperation. This framework identifies the nature of public discontent, the activities of political 
entrepreneurs and the permissiveness of political opportunity structures as important scope 
conditions for the politicization of international cooperation. We argue that public discontent 
alone does not pose a serious challenge to international institutions. For such discontent to 
matter politically, it must be politicized. How this politicization affects countries’ ability to 
engage in international cooperation and the stability of international institutions in turn depends 
on the nature of contestation, the international leverage of the skeptical country, and on how 
the international institution itself responds to this challenge.  
Our study also raises questions about the endogenous relationships underlying 
politicization. A first set of questions relate to the relationships between the mass public, 
political entrepreneurs and political opportunity structures at the domestic level. We have 
argued that certain institutional characteristics, such as electoral rules, multi-party systems and 
the presence referendums, make it easier for political entrepreneurs to strategically activate 
public contestation over international cooperation. Within systems with majoritarian electoral 
rules political entrepreneurs face higher barriers to entry.86 In these contexts, entrepreneurs have 
a strategic incentive to reshape political parties from within. If they succeed, the consequences 
for international cooperation are likely to be greater compared to more permissive contexts as 
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political entrepreneurs face less political and institutional pressure to comprise. The extent to 
which institutional rules shape the way in which political entrepreneurs frame and politicize 
international cooperation is an important area for future research.  
A second set of questions relate to the feedback effects between domestic and 
international politics, and across member states in international institutions. One set of feedback 
effects can occur horizontally. As the mass publics in other countries observe how one country’s 
voter-based challenge to international cooperation plays out on the international level, such 
challenges have the potential to reverberate both across countries and across time.87 Another 
set of feedback effects can occur vertically between the international level and the domestic 
level. For example, since international institutions in a low public contestation environment 
face less constraints on their actions than those who face high public contestation domestically, 
they can often perform their tasks more freely and effectively.88 This can create positive 
feedback effects as a demonstrated problem-solving capacity increases the mass public’s 
perception of the institution’s legitimacy.89 But such a response can also result in a growing 
intrusiveness of the international organization’s decisions that then fosters public 
contestation,90 thus moving the international organization from a low- into a high-public 
contestation scenario. Likewise, governments may respond to high levels of domestic 
contestation by depoliticizing decisions by turning them into highly technical affairs or 
delegating them to technocratic authorities.91 One danger with such a strategy is that it reduces 
the international organization’s accountability, another is that it may eventually turn the 
organization into a “zombie international organization” with limited activities.92  
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If international institutions respond by being more responsiveness to public concerns 
this may result in making international agreements more flexible, for example by including 
escape clauses,93 by decreasing the authority of international organizations,94 or by creating 
more democratic institutions that give political entrepreneurs new avenues to get involved. Such 
responsiveness can create positive feedback effects and may ultimately strengthen support for 
international cooperation, thus moving the international organization from a high- to a low-
public contestation scenario. But such a strategy also carries the risk of moving from a public 
discontent to a challenged international cooperation scenario, especially when measures put the 
benefits associated with the centralization of collective activities and independence of 
international organizations at risk. After all, the agency of political entrepreneurs suggests that 
there is no simple linear relationship between the level of international authority and the 
severity of the challenge posed to it by the mass public. Future research should explore these 
proposed feedback effects in greater detail. This study has provided a framework for 
understanding when and why the mass public poses a challenge to international cooperation 
and highlighted the need to recognize endogeneity as an integral feature of the relationship 
between domestic politics and international cooperation.  
In closing, we invite more theoretical and empirical work examining the causes and 
consequences of the politicization of international cooperation. We think that fusing insights 
from international relations and comparative politics as well as across different areas of regional 
expertise, North America, Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia, is the most fruitful way of 
doing this. When it comes to the causes of public contestation of international cooperation, we 
wish to see future work moving beyond the current debate between the role of economic 
grievances, cultural fears or worries about loss of national control. We suggest that 
understanding how people navigate these different aspects, how they make the relevant trade-
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offs, and how this is in turn related to support or opposition towards international cooperation 
more generally generate important insights. When it comes to the consequences of public 
contestation for international cooperation, international relations work should move away from 
making that simplifying assumptions about the public’s underlying preferences. Audience cost 
theory95 and research on two-level games in international negotiations96 assume that 
governments have a good understanding of how both their own and their opponent’s domestic 
audiences would react to different foreign policy decisions. Yet, our study suggests that the 
reality is often far more complicated. Oftentimes it is not easy for governments to predict public 
responses to foreign policy decisions. Governments may also find themselves caught off guard 
by political entrepreneurs who have every incentive to exploit even the tiniest of rifts between 
incumbents and their supporters. Likewise, studies examining how the preferences of median 
voter influences foreign policymaking by national governments and legislators97  and research 
on how governments take domestic preferences into account during international 
negotiations,98 such as when negotiating about the content and design of international 
institutions,99 assume that policymakers know their voters’ preferences and can use them as a 
strategic tool in international negotiations. We argue that governments often face high levels of 
uncertainty when it comes to ascertaining their voters’ preferences and understanding the extent 
to which they will be mobilized domestically, and this uncertainty may affect their behavior in 
international negotiations. The way in which it does is an important area of future research.  
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Figure 1: Support for international organizations, 1995-2013 
 
Source: International Social Survey Program, waves 1995. 2003, 2013. Share of respondents (dis)agreeing or 
strongly (dis)agreeing with each statement. 
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Figure 2: Party positions on European integration 
a. Mainstream and challenger parties b. Party families 
 
 
Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trendfile 
  
 43 
 
Figure 3: Voting outcomes of referendums on international cooperation, 1970-2019 
  
Source: C2D Database, authors’ own calculations. See Supplementary Material for details. 
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